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The Clipper chip was a chipset that was developed and promoted by the United States National Security Agency^[1] (NSA) as an encryption device that secured “voice and data messages'^[2] with a built-in backdoor. It was intended to be adopted by telecommunications companies for voice transmission. It can encipher and decipher messages. It was part of a Clinton Administration program to “allow Federal, State, and local law enforcement officials the ability to decode intercepted voice and data transmissions.'^[2] “Each clipper chip ha[d] a unique serial number and a secret ‘unit key,’ programmed into the chip when manufactured.'^[2] This way, each device was meant to be different from the next.

Jan 28, 2015  A configuration profile ensures that all FileVault keys are escrowed with the JSS. A smart group determines the computers without valid recovery keys. You can use a policy to generate a new FileVault key and upload to JSS. The Solution 6. The Solution. Policy A policy called “Reissue invalid or missing FileVault recovery key.

It was announced in 1993 and by 1996 was entirely defunct.

Key escrow[edit]

The Clipper chip used a data encryption algorithm called Skipjack^[1] to transmit information and the Diffie–Hellman key exchange-algorithm to distribute the cryptokeys between the peers. Skipjack was invented by the National Security Agency of the U.S. Government; this algorithm was initially classified SECRET, which prevented it from being subjected to peer review from the encryption research community. The government did state that it used an 80-bit key, that the algorithm was symmetric, and that it was similar to the DES algorithm. The Skipjack algorithm was declassified and published by the NSA on June 24, 1998. The initial cost of the chips was said to be $16 (unprogrammed) or $26 (programmed), with its logic designed by Mykotronx, and fabricated by VLSI Technology, Inc (see the VLSI logo on the image on this page).

At the heart of the concept was key escrow. In the factory, any new telephone or other device with a Clipper chip would be given a cryptographic key, that would then be provided to the government in escrow. If government agencies 'established their authority' to listen to a communication, then the key would be given to those government agencies, who could then decrypt all data transmitted by that particular telephone. The newly formed Electronic Frontier Foundation preferred the term 'key surrender' to emphasize what they alleged was really occurring.^[3]

Clinton Administration[edit]

The Clinton Administration argued that the Clipper chip was essential for law enforcement to keep up with the constantly progressing technology in the United States.^[2] While many believed that the device would act as an additional way for terrorists to receive information, the Clinton Administration said it would actually increase national security.^[4] They argued that because “terrorists would have to use it to communicate with outsiders — banks, suppliers, and contacts — the Government could listen in on those calls.”^[4]

Backlash[edit]

Organizations such as the Electronic Privacy Information Center and the Electronic Frontier Foundation challenged the Clipper chip proposal, saying that it would have the effect not only of subjecting citizens to increased and possibly illegal government surveillance, but that the strength of the Clipper chip's encryption could not be evaluated by the public as its design was classified secret, and that therefore individuals and businesses might be hobbled with an insecure communications system. Further, it was pointed out that while American companies could be forced to use the Clipper chip in their encryption products, foreign companies could not, and presumably phones with strong data encryption would be manufactured abroad and spread throughout the world and into the United States, negating the point of the whole exercise, and, of course, materially damaging U.S. manufacturers en route. Then-Senators John Ashcroft and John Kerry were opponents of the Clipper chip proposal, arguing in favor of the individual's right to encrypt messages and export encryption software.^[5]

The release and development of several strong cryptographic software packages such as Nautilus, PGP^[6] and PGPfone was in response to the government push for the Clipper chip. The thinking was that if strong cryptography was freely available on the internet as an alternative, the government would be unable to stop its use.

Technical vulnerabilities[edit]

In 1994, Matt Blaze published the paper Protocol Failure in the Escrowed Encryption Standard.^[7] It pointed out that the Clipper's escrow system has a serious vulnerability: the chip transmitted a 128-bit 'Law Enforcement Access Field' (LEAF) that contained the information necessary to recover the encryption key. To prevent the software that transmitted the message from tampering with the LEAF, a 16-bit hash was included. The Clipper chip would not decode messages with an invalid hash; however, the 16-bit hash was too short to provide meaningful security. A brute-force attack would quickly produce another LEAF value that would give the same hash but not yield the correct keys after the escrow attempt. This would allow the Clipper chip to be used as an encryption device, while disabling the key escrow capability.^[7]:63 In 1995 Yair Frankel and Moti Yung published another attack which is inherent to the design and which shows that the key escrow device tracking and authenticating capability (namely, the LEAF) of one device, can be attached to messages coming from another device and will nevertheless be received, thus bypassing the escrow in real time.^[8] In 1997, a group of leading cryptographers published a paper, 'The Risks of Key Recovery, Key Escrow, and Trusted Third-Party Encryption', analyzing the architectural vulnerabilities of implementing key escrow systems in general, including but not limited to the Clipper chip Skipjack protocol.^[9] The technical flaws described in this paper were instrumental in the demise of the Clipper chip as a public policy option.^{[citation needed]} While many leading voices in the computer science community expressed opposition to the Clipper chip and key recovery in general, some supported the concept, including Dorothy E. Denning.^[10]

Lack of adoption[edit]

The Clipper chip was not embraced by consumers or manufacturers and the chip itself was no longer relevant by 1996; the only significant purchaser of phones with the chip was the United States Department of Justice.^[11] The U.S. government continued to press for key escrow by offering incentives to manufacturers, allowing more relaxed export controls if key escrow were part of cryptographic software that was exported. These attempts were largely made moot by the widespread use of strong cryptographic technologies, such as PGP, which were not under the control of the U.S. government.

However, strongly encrypted voice channels are still not the predominant mode for current cell phone communications.^[12] Secure cell phone devices and smartphone apps exist, but may require specialized hardware, and typically require that both ends of the connection employ the same encryption mechanism. Such apps usually communicate over secure Internet pathways (e.g. ZRTP) instead of through phone voice data networks.

Later debates[edit]

Following the Snowden disclosures from 2013, Apple and Google announced that they would lock down all data stored on their smartphones with encryption, in such a way that Apple and Google themselves could not break the encryption even if ordered to do so with a warrant.^[13] This prompted a strong reaction from the authorities, including the chief of detectives for Chicago's police department stating that 'Apple['s iPhone] will become the phone of choice for the pedophile'.^[14] An editorial in the Washington Post argued that 'smartphone users must accept that they cannot be above the law if there is a valid search warrant', and after agreeing that backdoors would be undesirable, suggested implementing a 'golden key' backdoor which would unlock the data with a warrant.^[15][16] The members of 'The Risks of Key Recovery, Key Escrow, and Trusted Third-Party Encryption' 1997 paper, as well as other researchers at MIT, wrote a follow-up article in response to the revival of this debate, arguing that mandated government access to private conversations would be an even worse problem now than twenty years ago.^[17]

See also[edit]

• Crypto: How the Code Rebels Beat the Government—Saving Privacy in the Digital Age by Steven Levy

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References[edit]

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1. ^ ^ab'Clipper Chip - Definition of Clipper Chip'. computer.yourdictionary.com. Retrieved 2014-01-11.
2. ^ ^abcdMcLoughlin, Glenn J. (September 8, 1995). 'The Clipper Chip A Fact Sheet Update'. Congressional Proquest.
3. ^'Clipper Chip'. cryptomuseum.com. Retrieved 2014-01-11.
4. ^ ^abLevy, Steven (June 12, 1994). 'Battle of the Clipper Chip'. The New York Times.
5. ^Summary of Encryption Bills in the 106th Congress
6. ^Philip Zimmermann - Why I Wrote PGP (Part of the Original 1991 PGP User's Guide (updated in 1999))
7. ^ ^abBlaze, Matt (August 20, 1994). 'Protocol Failure in the Escrowed Encryption Standard'(PDF). Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security: 59–67.
8. ^Y. Frankel and M. Yung. Escrow Encryption Systems Visited: Attacks, Analysis and Designs. Crypto 95 Proceedings, August 1995
9. ^The Risks of Key Recovery, Key Escrow, and Trusted Third-Party Encryption
10. ^Denning, Dorothy E. (July 1995). 'The Case for Clipper (Clipper Chip offers escrowed encryption)'. MIT Technology Review.
11. ^From Clipper Chip to Smartphones: Unlocking the Encryption Debate
12. ^Timberg, Craig; Soltani, Ashkan (December 13, 2013), 'By cracking cellphone code, NSA has ability to decode private conversations', The Washington Post, retrieved August 18, 2015, More than 80 percent of cellphones worldwide use weak or no encryption for at least some of their calls.
13. ^'Why can't Apple decrypt your iPhone?'. 2014-10-04.
14. ^Craig Timberg and Greg Miller (25 Sep 2014). 'FBI blasts Apple, Google for locking police out of phones'. The Washington Post. Retrieved 1 Apr 2016.
15. ^Editorial Board (3 Oct 2014). 'Compromise needed on smartphone encryption'. The Washington Post. Retrieved 1 Apr 2016.
16. ^Mike Masnick (6 Oct 2014). 'Washington Post's Clueless Editorial On Phone Encryption: No Backdoors, But How About A Magical 'Golden Key'?'. Tech Dirt. Retrieved 1 Apr 2016.
17. ^Abelson, Harold; et al. (July 6, 2015). 'Keys Under Doormats: Mandating insecurity by requiring government access to all data and communications'. MIT Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory. hdl:1721.1/97690.Cite journal requires |journal= (help)

External links[edit]

• The Evolution of US Government Restrictions on Using and Exporting Encryption Technologies (U), Michael Schwartzbeck, Encryption Technologies, circa 1997, formerly Top Secret, approved for release by NSA with redactions September 10, 2014, C06122418
• Oral history interview with Martin Hellman Oral history interview 2004, Palo Alto, California. Charles Babbage Institute, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis. Hellman describes his invention of public key cryptography with collaborators Whitfield Diffie and Ralph Merkle at Stanford University in the mid-1970s. He also relates his subsequent work in cryptography with Steve Pohlig (the Pohlig-Hellman system) and others. Hellman addresses key escrow (the so-called Clipper chip). He also touches on the commercialization of cryptography with RSA Data Security and VeriSign.

The Microsoft Intune encryption report is a centralized location to view details about a device’s encryption status and find options to manage device recovery keys. The recovery key options that are available depend on the type of device you're viewing.

To find the report, Sign in to the Microsoft Endpoint Manager admin center. Select Devices > Monitor, and then under Configuration, select Encryption report.

View encryption details

The encryption report shows common details across the supported devices you manage. The following sections provide details about the information that Intune presents in the report.

Prerequisites

The encryption report supports reporting on devices that run the following operating system versions:

• macOS 10.13 or later
• Windows version 1607 or later

Report details

The Encryption report pane displays a list of the devices you manage with high-level details about those devices. You can select a device from the list to drill-in and view additional details from the devices Device encryption status pane.

• Device name - The name of the device.

• OS – The device platform, such as Windows or macOS.

• OS version – The version of Windows or macOS on the device.

• TPM version(Applies to Windows 10 only) – The version of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip on the Windows 10 device.

• Encryption readiness – An evaluation of the devices readiness to support an applicable encryption technology, like BitLocker or FileVault encryption. Devices are identified as:

  • Ready: The device can be encrypted by using MDM policy, which requires the device meet the following requirements:

    For macOS devices:

    • MacOS version 10.13 or later

    For Windows 10 devices:

    • Version 1703 or later, of Business, Enterprise, Education, or version 1809 or later of Pro
    • The device must have a TPM chip

    For more information, see the BitLocker configuration service provider (CSP) in the Windows documentation.

  • Not ready: The device doesn't have full encryption capabilities, but still supports encryption. For example, a Windows device might be encrypted manually by a user, or through Group Policy that can be set to allow encrypting without a TPM.

  • Not applicable: There isn't enough information to classify this device.

• Encryption status – Whether the OS drive is encrypted.

• User Principal Name - The primary user of the device.

Device encryption status

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When you select a device from the Encryption report, Intune displays the Device encryption status pane. This pane provides the following details:

• Device name – The name of the device you're viewing.

• Encryption readiness - An evaluation of the devices readiness to support encryption through the MDM policy.

  For example: When a Windows 10 device has a readiness of Not ready, it might still support encryption. To have the Ready designation, the Windows 10 device must have a TPM chip. TPM chips aren't required to support encryption. (For more information, see Encryption readiness in the preceding section.)

• Encryption status - Whether the OS drive is encrypted. It can take up to 24 hours for Intune to report on a device’s encryption status or a change to that status. This time includes time for the OS to encrypt, plus time for the device to report back to Intune.

  To speed up the reporting of FileVault encryption status before device check-in normally occurs, have users sync their devices after encryption completes.

• Profiles – A list of the Device configuration profiles that apply to this device and are configured with the following values:

  • macOS:

    • Profile type = Endpoint protection
    • Settings > FileVault > FileVault = Enable

  • Windows 10:

    • Profile type = Endpoint protection
    • Settings > Windows Encryption > Encrypt devices = Require

  You can use the list of profiles to identify individual policies for review should the Profile state summary indicate problems.

• Profile state summary – A summary of the profiles that apply to this device. The summary represents the least favorable condition across the applicable profiles. For example, if only one out of several applicable profiles results in an error, the Profile state summary will display Error.

  To view more details of a status, go to Intune > Device configuration > Profiles, and select the profile. Optionally, select Device status and then select a device.

• Status details – Advanced details about the device’s encryption state.

  Important

  For Windows 10 devices, Intune only shows Status details for devices that run the Windows 10 April 2019 Update or later.

  This field displays information for each applicable error that can be detected. You can use this information to understand why a device might not be encryption ready.

  The following are examples of the status details Intune can report:

  macOS:

  • The recovery key hasn't been retrieved and stored yet. Most likely, the device hasn't been unlocked, or it hasn't checked in.

    Consider: This result doesn't necessarily represent an error condition but a temporary state that could be because of timing on the device where escrow for recovery keys must be set up before the encryption request is sent to the device. This status might also indicate the device remains locked or hasn’t checked in with Intune recently. Finally, because FileVault encryption doesn’t start until a device is plugged in (charging), it’s possible for a user to receive a recovery key for a device that isn't yet encrypted.

  • The user is deferring encryption or is currently in the process of encryption.

    Consider: Either the user hasn't yet logged out after receiving the encryption request, which is necessary before FileVault can encrypt the device, or the user has manually decrypted the device. Intune can't prevent a user from decrypting their device.

  • The device is already encrypted. Device user must decrypt the device to continue.

    Consider: Intune can’t set up FileVault on a device that is already encrypted. Instead, the user needs to manually decrypt their device before it can be managed by a device configuration policy and Intune.

  • FileVault needs the user to approve their management profile in MacOS Catalina and higher.

    Consider: Beginning with MacOS version 10.15 (Catalina), user approved enrollment settings can result in the requirement that users manually approve FileVault encryption. For more information, see User Approved enrollment in the Intune documentation.

  • Unknown.

    Consider: One possible cause for an unknown status is that the device is locked and Intune can’t start the escrow or encryption process. After the device is unlocked, progress can continue.

  Windows 10:

  • The BitLocker policy requires user consent to launch the BitLocker Drive Encryption Wizard to start encryption of the OS volume but the user didn't consent.

  • The encryption method of the OS volume doesn't match the BitLocker policy.

  • The policy BitLocker requires a TPM protector to protect the OS volume, but a TPM isn't used.

  • The BitLocker policy requires a TPM-only protector for the OS volume, but TPM protection isn't used.

  • The BitLocker policy requires TPM+PIN protection for the OS volume, but a TPM+PIN protector isn't used.

  • The BitLocker policy requires TPM+startup key protection for the OS volume, but a TPM+startup key protector isn't used.

  • The BitLocker policy requires TPM+PIN+startup key protection for the OS volume, but a TPM+PIN+startup key protector isn't used.

  • The OS volume is unprotected.

  • Recovery key backup failed.

  • A fixed drive is unprotected.

  • The encryption method of the fixed drive doesn't match the BitLocker policy.

  • To encrypt drives, the BitLocker policy requires either the user to sign in as an Administrator or, if the device is joined to Azure AD, the AllowStandardUserEncryption policy must be set to 1.

  • Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) isn't configured.

  • A TPM isn't available for BitLocker, either because it isn't present, it's been made unavailable in the Registry, or the OS is on a removable drive.

  • The TPM isn't ready for BitLocker.

  • The network isn't available, which is required for recovery key backup.

Export report details

While viewing the Encryption report pane, you can select Export to create a .csv file download of the report details. This report includes the high-level details from the Encryption report pane and Device encryption status details for each device you manage.

This report can be of use in identifying problems for groups of devices. For example, you might use the report to identify a list of macOS devices that all report FileVault is already enabled by the user, which indicates devices that must be manually decrypted before Intune can manage their FileVault settings.

FileVault recovery keys

When Intune first encrypts a macOS device with FileVault, a personal recovery key is created. Upon encryption, the device displays the personal key a single time to the end-user.

For managed devices, Intune can escrow a copy of the personal recovery key. Escrow of keys enables Intune administrators to rotate keys to help protect devices, and users to recover a lost or rotated personal recovery key.

Intune supports multiple options to rotate and recover personal recovery keys. One reason to rotate a key is if the current personal key is lost or thought to be at risk.

Important

Devices that are encrypted by users, and not by Intune, cannot be managed by Intune. This means that Intune can't escrow the personal recovery of these devices, nor manage the rotation of the recovery key. Before Intune can manage FileVault and recovery keys for the device, the user must decrypt their device, and then let Intune encrypt the device.

Rotate recovery keys

• Automatic rotation: As an admin, you can configure the FileVault setting Personal recovery key rotation to automatically generate new recovery key’s periodically. When a new key is generated for a device, the key isn’t displayed to the user. Instead, the user must get the key either from an admin, or by using the company portal app.

• Manual rotation: As an admin, you can view information for a device that you manage with Intune and that’s encrypted with FileVault. You can then choose to manually rotate the recovery key for corporate devices. You can’t rotate recovery keys for personal devices.

  To rotate a recovery key:

  1. Sign in to the Microsoft Endpoint Manager admin center.

  2. Select Devices > All devices.

  3. From the list of devices, select the device that is encrypted and for which you want to rotate its key. Then under Monitor, select Recovery keys.

  4. On the Recovery keys pane, select Rotate FileVault recovery key.

     The next time the device checks in with Intune, the personal key is rotated. When needed, the new key can be obtained by the end-user through the company portal.

Recover recovery keys

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• Administrator: Administrators can't view personal recovery keys for devices that are encrypted with FileVault.

• End-user: End-users use the Company Portal website from any device to view the current personal recovery key for any of their managed devices. You can't view recovery keys from the Company Portal app.

  To view a recovery key:

  1. Sign in to the Intune Company Portal website from any device.

  2. In the portal, go to Devices and select the macOS device that is encrypted with FileVault.

  3. Select Get recovery key. The current recovery key is displayed.

BitLocker recovery keys

Intune provides access to the Azure AD blade for BitLocker so you can view BitLocker Key IDs and recovery keys for your Windows 10 devices, from within the Intune portal. To be accessible, the device must have its keys escrowed to Azure AD.

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1. Sign in to the Microsoft Endpoint Manager admin center.

2. Select Devices > All devices.

3. Select a device from the list, and then under Monitor, select Recovery keys.

   When keys are available in Azure AD, the following information is available:

   • BitLocker Key ID
   • BitLocker Recovery Key
   • Drive Type

   When keys aren't in Azure AD, Intune will display No BitLocker key found for this device.

Information for BitLocker is obtained using the BitLocker configuration service provider (CSP). BitLocker CSP is supported on Windows 10 version 1703 and later, and for Windows 10 Pro version 1809 and later.

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